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In an article in the British newspaper The Guardian, journalist Jason Burke—who has 
written extensively on terrorism—frames a commentary on the 2019 Christchurch 
shootings with the observation that terrorism is effective because “it always seems near. 
It always seems new. And it always seems personal.” Burke continues that “ever since the 
first wave of terrorist violence broke across the newly industrialized cities of the west in 
the late 19th century, this has been true.”1 This narrow casting of terrorism as a western 
industrial phenomenon only 150 years old is perhaps enough to show why Genealogies of 
Terrorism is a necessary book. Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson has also more interestingly 
demonstrated, however, that while terrorism may feel near, new, and personal, this is 
itself a contingent response that deserves to be unseated with the more careful historical 
and conceptual analysis she offers. Indeed, to the extent that contemporary western states 
iteratively reinvent terrorism as whatever feels near, new, and personal, we are held 
captive by an unexamined picture of terrorism (and the terrorist) that easily serves 
propaganda purposes—perhaps especially purposes of state security.  
This book has a complex argument, and I am not a scholar of terrorism. Rather, I have 
worked with a similar Wittgensteinian-Foucauldian method (most notably in my book 
Self-Transformations,2 and here I have little to say about the historical work that forms the 
body of the book (and which clearly relies on a deep grasp of a diverse and difficult 
archive). Instead, I focus on the book’s intriguing method and on the later chapters, which 
constitute an important intervention in contemporary political philosophy and a 
corrective to much contemporary political rhetoric about terrorism. Suffice to say that 
Erlenbusch-Anderson is arguing that a Foucauldian genealogical approach to the 
conditions of the emergence of “terrorism” best addresses the methodological challenges 
in its articulation. Rather than make ahistorical, stipulative assumptions about what 
terrorism is, Erlenbusch-Anderson suggests that it is best understood as a plural and 
contextual phenomenon that, as Wittgenstein might have said, gains meaning from the 
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contexts of its use. That is not to say, of course, that the term “terrorism” functions without 
referent, or that it can be reworked without challenge to serve any political purpose. 
Rather, it is to analyze terrorism in its multiple contexts, historical and contemporary, to 
show how its agents, targets, and goals evolve.  
To be more specific, Erlenbusch-Anderson’s book argues that “terrorism functions—
and has functioned since the eighteenth century—as a mechanism of social defense that 
is deployed when biopolitical concerns about the life of the population and the survival 
of the nation come into tension with traditional sovereign interests.”3 The historical work 
of making this case through discussion of the French Revolution, late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Russia, and Algerian colonial war, enables her to identify a number of 
different strands in the weave of terrorism: charismatic, systemic, doxastic, identarian, 
strategic, criminal, and polemic terrorism, which come together in the contemporary 
world in synthetic terrorism. Synthetic terrorism, she argues, emerges from American 
neoconservatism in the 1970s,4 and much of the later part of the book examines this form 
and its post-9/11 functions. Especially today in the United States, she argues, terrorism is 
polysemous.5 It has been ascribed to diverse individual actions and to the actions of other 
states that are understood to oppose liberal ideals of freedom and equality, which are in 
turn tied to free markets, and to capitalist economic systems more broadly. This 
ideological construction of synthetic terrorism as not only a challenge to the state’s 
interests but also to something more universal that the US in particular represents, 
Erlenbusch-Anderson argues, means that “while previously the dispositif of terrorism 
served to defend society or the nation from internal and external threats, what is defended 
today is not just a particular national or social body but also a specific notion of 
humanity.”6 
Terrorism studies: two implicit alternatives 
This book is a key resource and corrective to (at least) two genres of writing and models 
of understanding: the first from government grey literature and mainstream Political 
Science, the second from a more humanistic and interdisciplinary genre of political theory.  
First, think about the way terrorism is represented—as it must be, now—by western 
governments. The Canadian state response to terrorism, is, for example, in its public-
facing presentation, a more even-handed and evidence-based approach than in the US, 
and ostensibly aims to promote community conditions that will inhibit recruitment to 
jihadism as well as to white nationalist movements: 
In Canada, the definition of terrorist activity includes an act or omission undertaken, 
inside or outside Canada, for a political, religious or ideological purpose that is intended 
to intimidate the public with respect to its security, including its economic security, or 
to compel a person, government or organization (whether inside or outside Canada) 
 
3 Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson, Genealogies of Terrorism: Revolution, State Violence, Empire (2018), 11. 
4 Ibid., 137. 
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from doing or refraining from doing any act, and that intentionally causes one of a 
number of specified forms of serious harm.7 
Here we clearly see the typical consequences of terrorism—intimidation, serious harm—
all structured around damage to “the public;” along with a certain elision of Canada (the 
nation-state) with its people, and in turn with its government; and security as including 
economic security. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the implication of the Canadian state in 
practices of intimidation (Oka crisis, residential schools) that intentionally cause serious 
harm (First Nations genocide, environmental destruction of land) for political, religious, 
or ideological purpose (settler colonialism) is not countenanced. The scholarly literature 
is more subtle. Nonetheless, it seems to be rare in terrorism studies that the question of 
whether western states might commit terrorist acts is discussed, except as some kind of 
radical sidebar. One obvious lesson here is that policy-oriented political scientists should 
be reading books like Genealogies of Terrorism. A finer point is that genealogy as engaged 
critique offers a radical challenge to the implicit normativity of some genres of “terrorism 
studies.”  
Reading Anthony Richards’ attempt to define terrorism, for example, immediately 
shows the contrast between his approach and Erlenbusch-Anderson’s. Like her, he rejects 
eliminativism—the view that we should stop using the word “terrorism” altogether as it is 
so inconsistently and strategically attributed. Richards begins his definitional gambit by 
stipulating “the essence of terrorism,” which is “purpose-based”8: “terrorism is the use of 
violence or the threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating a psychological 
impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political motive.”9 Richards 
rejects the suggestions that terrorism can be defined through the identity of its 
perpetrators or target victims, or the political orientation of its cause, and in this way his 
argument is not at odds with Erlenbusch-Anderson’s. The objection to his own argument 
that Richards anticipates (and the bullet that he bites) is the obvious one that intent to 
generate broad psychological impact for political motives is difficult to prove, likely 
leading to endless psychologizing about various political actors.10 He does not anticipate 
the further objection that “intentions” are the kinds of things most easily attributable to 
individuals or small groups of people who commit discrete acts, and are most difficult to 
connect to large political entities like states or to ongoing processes of terrorist attrition; 
there is, therefore, a bias toward certain kinds of actor and action built into his definition, 
and Genealogies of Terrorism helps us to see this elision. From a Foucauldian-
Wittgensteinian perspective, however, what is perhaps more striking about Richards’ 
project is his conviction that terrorism must be a priori defined and cannot merely be 
“described”—an activity he seems to view as pre-theoretical, and that leads him to the 
tautological claim that “describing terrorism...is not an alternative to defining or 
 
7 Government of Canada, Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Ottawa, 
ON: Public Safety Canada, 2011, 7. 
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conceptualizing the phenomenon because it does not help us to classify what terrorism is 
or is not, or to determine what its parameters are—this needs a definition.”11 This quote 
surely illustrates that terrorism studies needs both Foucauldian genealogy and 
Wittgensteinian anti-essentialism! 
Second, Erlenbusch-Anderson’s book is related to engagements with terrorism from 
within the interdisciplinary humanities. In 2017, a ten-year anniversary edition of Puar’s 
Terrorist Assemblages was published (with a new postscript--“homonationalism in trump 
times”), while in 2018, Heike Schotten published Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the 
Settler Colony. I am interested in how these books intersect, and I understand them as part 
of a renewed interest in theoretical work about terrorism that branches away from 
Political Science and was kick-started by Puar but cannot be reduced to her influence. 
Puar, of course, argues that the recuperation of privileged homosexuals—the white, 
wealthy, and normatively coupled—into the narratives of US patriotism and nationalism 
establishes a self-declared progressive foil, against which the brown, foreign, and 
deviantly queer terrorist can be juxtaposed. This deployment of sexual politics to bolster 
racist nation-building projects she famously calls “homonationalism:” “to mark 
arrangements of U.S. sexual exceptionalism explicitly in relation to the nation… I argue 
that the Orientalist invocation of the terrorist is one discursive tactic that disaggregates 
U.S. national gays and queers from racial and sexual others, foregrounding a collusion 
between homosexuality and American nationalism that is generated both by national 
rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and by gay and queer subjects themselves.”12 
Recall that Puar also claims to offer us genealogies of terrorism, although her reading 
of Foucault is more notional than the careful interpretive work offered by Erlenbusch-
Anderson. She suggests that Orientalist readings of gender and sexuality in Islamic 
culture dovetail with secular liberal, conservative anti-terror and radical feminist 
interpretations to produce the perversely homosocial young brown Muslim man who 
hates western values and women as the terrorist archetype. By contrast, the white 
homonationalist subject demonstrates his patriotism through professed liberal values and 
cosmopolitan consumerism. How does this genealogy of the contemporary terrorist, 
which has defined a certain kind of humanistic approach to “the war on terror,” connect 
with Erlenbusch-Anderson’s genealogy of terrorism? It is not exactly clear to me how 
these two intersect: sometimes Erlenbusch-Anderson is talking about the structuring 
norms of race and religion that put some particular kinds of people—or even specific 
individuals like Boston marathon bomber Dzokhar Tsarnaev or Charleston church 
shooter Dylann Roof—outside citizenship or even humanity, but at other times about the 
evolution of a political phenomenon relatively disconnected from any particular political 
subjects.  
Returning to Schotten, one of the topic terms in Erlenbusch-Anderson’s title is 
“empire.” Her understanding of empire and imperialism, however, functions largely tacitly 
in the book. She is primarily interested, I infer, in US imperialism of the sort epitomized 
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by “military aggression” in the Middle East that invokes a distinctive raison d’État that 
aims to “defend humanity against dangerous threats” and posits non-western cultures as 
barbaric, backward, and outside the narrative of progress that undergirds the 
understanding of liberal democratic capitalism as the apotheosis of humanity. The 
imperialism of the US, therefore, is globalizing and expansionist—ideologically and in 
terms of geopolitics—projecting itself beyond the boundaries of the state.13 Erlenbusch-
Anderson and Schotten make fascinatingly similar-yet-different arguments, both focusing 
on genealogical analysis of the biopolitical rationalities that inform contemporary terrorist 
discourse while drawing on divergent archives. Schotten’s book pulls together political 
theory and queer theory (in ways indebted to Puar), but also adds Native Studies to the 
mix, to suggest that imperial rationality, with its civilizational impetus, begins at home. 
Not only the Islamic Other, but also the Indigenous Other is opposed to “life itself” and 
constructed as the original savage against which the same moralism can be deployed. In 
this case, though, it is settler sovereignty—not expansionist imperialism—that seeks to 
justify itself as the source and guarantor of the human: 
Indigenous removal and dispossession are accomplished...not only via the exertion of 
violence, domination, war, famine, genocide, and disease, but also via a specifically 
ideological imposition of the meaning of ‘life’ and ‘death’ that requires an indigenous 
removal and dispossession that it cannot accomplish without killing itself. This 
intractable dilemma explains the transformation of settler societies into security states, 
which reformulates the indigenous threat of ‘savagery’ and death into external 
terroristic opponents of its ‘way of life.’14 
Drawing on allusions to “Indian country” or victories at the domestic frontier that are 
both historical and metaphorical, Schotten suggests that “as the ‘terrorist’ obstacles to 
empire become projected versions of Indians, Indians become retroactively legible as the 
first or foundational examples of ‘terrorism’.”15 These projects are linked, Schotten argues, 
by biopolitical futurism.  The “life” that sovereign biopolitics seeks to protect is civilized 
settler life; it is life that has a future defined through its essential historical progress 
(indeed, Schotten suggests, civilization is temporal while savagery has no time at all).16 
“The ‘savage’ of the Americas thus becomes the symbolic negative—the embodiment of 
the state of nature itself”,17 and concomitantly is that which must die or was always 
already dead. In her genealogy of terrorism, therefore, Schotten argues that the 
civilizational moralism of the state is crucially that of the settler state. In forcing us to 
choose to be “with us or with the terrorists,” she provocatively concludes, George Bush 
got something right: “If the only options are, as Bush says, to side with a futurist, settler, 
and imperial ‘us’ (whether as avowed advocates of empire or its collaborationist liberal 
 
13 Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson, Genealogies of Terrorism: Revolution, State Violence, Empire (2018), 160-161. 
14 Heike Schotten, Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony (2018), 59. 
15 Ibid., 60. 
16 Ibid., 50. 
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compromisers) or with a queered, ‘savage,’ and ‘terrorist’ other, the choice, I think is clear: 
we must choose to stand with the ‘terrorists’.”18 
The discourse of liberal freedom and equality that undergirds (however tenuously) US 
liberal democracy and free-market capitalism, Erlenbusch-Anderson argues, provides an 
ideological justification for the US use of force against foreign regimes in the name of both 
preserving US interests and promoting global human rights—goals that can be presented 
as synonymous only when convenient. This project, Erlenbusch-Anderson writes, should 
be “understood as an exercise of the old sovereign right to kill for the biopolitical purpose 
of ensuring the survival and well-being not only of the nation but also of humanity.”19 
The understanding of the nation, and perhaps even of humanity, in play here is the settler 
nation and its settler citizens, to implicitly return to my earlier example of the Canadian 
state as potential terrorist. Indigenous leaders in Canada challenge the sovereignty of 
Canada, as they have always done and continue to do, on the basis of illegitimate treaties, 
broken treaty terms, and unceded land. They are challenging the hypocrisy of liberal 
norms (that allow, for example, many First Nations communities in Canada to live 
without drinkable tap water in one of the richest countries in the world) as well as the 
linking of those norms to an economic system that relies on extractive industries that 
destroy the land with no end or alternative in sight. To invoke these realities is to deploy 
Schotten’s ideas in one fairly straightforward way as adding a layer of analysis of empire-
building to Genealogies of Terrorism. I also wonder, however, if the significantly different 
genealogy of terrorism that Schotten offers can be accommodated within the historical 
specificity of Erlenbusch-Anderson’s account. When the latter says: “a normative 
reconstruction of the concept of terrorism must be compatible with its genealogy—that is, 
with a genealogy of terrorism”,20 I wonder if she thinks that the genealogy of settler 
colonialism, biopolitical futurism, and life and death that Schotten offers is, in fact, 
compatible with her own genealogy?  
Foucault often reminds us that genealogy is “without constants:” “nothing in man 
[sic]—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or 
for understanding other men.”21 Genealogy as a method opposes the idea of any single 
unity progressing through history and instead focuses on accumulating accounts of those 
historical threads that, taken together, create the conditions of possibility for certain kinds 
of subjects to exist (raising again the question of whether there is a gap between the 
terrorist and terrorism). Would Erlenbusch-Anderson be philosophically enabled or 
politically willing to “extract norms from the practices of those who are engaged in 
political struggles”22 to point in any particular direction? Given the similarity of their 
professed methods, would she draw the normative conclusion that Schotten does—that 
 
18 Ibid., 130. 
19 Erlenbusch-Anderson, Genealogies of Terrorism: Revolution, State Violence, Empire (2018), 142. 
20 Ibid., 175. 
21 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays 
and Interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. and introduced by Donald F. Bouchard (1977), 153. 
22 Genealogies of Terrorism: Revolution, State Violence, Empire (2018), 181. 
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we must choose to stand with the terrorists?—a claim admittedly made for rhetorical 
effect, but not thereby without power?  
Erlenbusch-Anderson ends her book with Fanon’s interpretation of Algerian resistance 
to French colonialism as an “understanding of terrorism as the only form of struggle 
appropriate for conditions of domination and occupation. On Fanon’s view,” she writes, 
“terrorism is a form of counterattack determined by material conditions of a prior 
conflict.”23 This view was part of “a larger project of anticolonial critique that challenges 
us to critically examine entrenched assumptions about state violence as the only legitimate 
form of violence, public order as lawful and peaceable, and civilians as innocent 
bystanders of colonial oppression.”24 Fanon was hardly non-partisan; cutting a very 
different figure than Foucault, he argued (and fought) tirelessly against racism and 
colonial oppression. Thus, finally, how might Erlenbusch-Anderson extend her book to 
elaborate the suggestive point on which she concludes: that a reconstructive project that 
“derives norms from the normative practices of those who are fighting”25 is compatible 
with her genealogical approach? 
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